It’s one thing when journalists complain about failures in the country’s counter-terrorism activities. It carries greater weight when the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issues a report detailing these failures.
The GAO Statement for the Record to the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives, titled, Homeland Security
Better Use of Terrorist Watchlist Information and Improvements in Deployment of Passenger Screening Checkpoint Technologies Could Further Strengthen Security raises serious questions about the counter-terrorism lists used by our government for everyday flight screening.
This latest GAO report was issued after the December 2009 Christmas bombing attempt on a Delta flight landing in Detroit from Amsterdam.
The basic question is, “Are our counter-terrorism lists effectively being used to protect the U.S. air transportation system?”
In the introduction to the report, inspectors noted:
In October 2007, GAO reported that not checking against all records may pose a security risk and recommended that DHS and the FBI assess potential vulnerabilities, but they have not completed these assessments. …the government lacks an up-to-date strategy and implementation plan—supported by a clearly defined leadership or governance structure—which are needed to enhance the effectiveness of terrorist-related screening and ensure accountability.
Many have repeated that our intelligence system did not connect the dots to find Mr. Abdulmutallab. Others claimed that the problem was a misspelling. Here is the GAO report, noting that the Nigerian panty bomber might have never made the list even with all of the dots connected. The report went on to note that the “dots” were not even all in the same place, so that they could have been connected. (Emphasis added)
The White House’s review of the December 25 attempted terrorist attack noted that Mr. Abdulmutallab’s father met with U.S. Embassy officers in Abuja, Nigeria, to discuss his concerns that his son may have come under the influence of unidentified extremists and had planned to travel to Yemen.14 However, according to NCTC, the information in the State Department’s nomination report did not meet the criteria for watchlisting in TSC’s consolidated terrorist screening database per the government’s established and approved nomination standards. NCTC also noted that the State Department cable nominating Mr. Abdulmutallab had no indication that the father was the source of the information.
Even if we had all of the information and everyone had connected the dots and Abdulmutallab’s name was flagged at Schiphol Airport, according to the GAO report, “the White House’s review of the December 25 attempted terrorist attack raised questions about the effectiveness of the No-Fly and Selectee list criteria.” Specifically, would the current rules have resulted in keeping Abdulmutallab off the plane?
Unfortunately, the Federal Government’s organizations are still working in “stovepipe mode” (not sharing all information with each other) when it comes to terrorism. Various agencies only access the terrorist list components that they or the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) feels is necessary to their mission.
The GAO report notes, “screening against certain records may not be needed to support a respective agency’s mission or may not be possible because of computer system limitations, among other things.” Hence, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) only gets one set of records fitting their mission. The State Department get another separate list dealing with issuing visas. And the FBI receives a smaller portion of the database.
The idea that a possible terrorist on the no-fly list or selectee list being included in a national counter-terrorism database, so that all of their movements can be detected, is a pipe dream. Technically, it is possible, but it is not done.
According to the GAO report, the TSA is not utilizing the full Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) list. “According to TSA, as of January 2010, the agency was developing administrative procedures for utilizing the full watchlist when warranted.”
The GAO report also noted that back in 2007 they made recommendations to establish better leadership — “an effective governance structure as part of this strategic approach is particularly vital since numerous agencies and components are involved in the development, maintenance, and use of the watchlist process, both within and outside of the federal government.”
To date, that “governance structure” has not been created.
This GAO report released at a House Homeland Security Committee hearing on January 27, 2010, is an unsettling examination of the state of our terrorism intelligence processing.
Poor leadership, unclear definitions, technical limitations, agencies working in parallel rather than together and conflicting missions are all hobbling our counter-terrorism efforts.
Charlie Leocha is the President of Travelers United. He has been working in Washington, DC, for the past 14 years with Congress, the Department of Transportation, and industry stakeholders on travel issues. He was the first consumer representative to the Advisory Committee for Aviation Consumer Protections appointed by the Secretary of Transportation from 2012 through 2018.
